Prerequisites for negotiation. From an empirical, if not theoretical, point of view, it seems that the following conditions must be met if an international conference on raw materials is to reach an agreement: controls on the market price of certain raw materials have undesirable side effects, both politically and economically. The seriousness of the export quotas imposed under the Tin Agreement from December 1957 to September 1960 seems to have had a long-term impact on production capacity; When restrictions on tin exports were eased, production could not be revived at the same rate as a strong recovery in consumption and, therefore, this raw material is a classic example of the irreversible supply curve. One of the possible lessons of Fidel Castro`s Cuban experience is that there is a subtle and indirect relationship between economic forms of market control and a certain degree of political tyranny. Such a philosophy was shared by supporters of the Anti-Corn-Law League in nineteenth-century England, who built their case on a supposed link between free trade and world peace. (4) Mixed producer-consumer interest. The longest agreements at present are products for which the major industrialized countries have rather mixed motivations. Thus, the United Kingdom, as an importing country, is interested in relatively low sugar prices; But as an advocate for Commonwealth countries in the West Indies and Oceania, the UK does not want world sugar prices to fall to catastrophic levels. In the days leading up to Castro, the U.S. was aiming for a higher price for sugar shipments from Cuba to non-U.S. countries.
Destinations that even Cubans, a little more impressed by the desire to maintain the volume of exports. The new coffee agreement also reflects a certain reciprocity of the interests of producers and consumers within the main importing countries: there are no domestic sources of supply, but the industrialized countries of the temperate zone are largely concerned about the well-being of the less developed countries of the tropical regions of Latin America and Africa, which supply the bulk of the world`s coffee exports. The USTR leads U.S. participation in two commodity trade agreements: the International Tropical Timber Agreement and the International Coffee Agreement (ICA). Both agreements create intergovernmental organizations with government councils. It has been argued that price stabilization, which is paid for only a portion of world export sales, tends to largely destabilize the price of the rest (Johnson 1950). . . .